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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a symmetric-key Latin square image cipher (LSIC) for grayscale and color images.
Our contributions to the image encryption community include 1) we develop new Latin square image encryption
primitives including Latin Square Whitening, Latin Square S-box and Latin Square P-box ; 2) we provide a new
way of integrating probabilistic encryption in image encryption by embedding random noise in the least significant
image bit-plane; and 3) we construct LSIC with these Latin square image encryption primitives all on one keyed
Latin square in a new loom-like substitution-permutation network. Consequently, the proposed LSIC achieve many
desired properties of a secure cipher including a large key space, high key sensitivities, uniformly distributed
ciphertext, excellent confusion and diffusion properties, semantically secure, and robustness against channel noise.
Theoretical analysis show that the LSIC has good resistance to many attack models including brute-force attacks,
ciphertext-only attacks, known-plaintext attacks and chosen-plaintext attacks. Experimental analysis under extensive
simulation results using the complete USC-SIPI Miscellaneous image dataset demonstrate that LSIC outperforms or
reach state of the art suggested by many peer algorithms. All these analysis and results demonstrate that the LSIC
is very suitable for digital image encryption. Finally, we open source the LSIC MATLAB code under webpage
https://sites.google.com/site/tuftsyuewu/source-code.
Index Terms
Image encryption, Latin square, Substitution-permutation network, Confusion-diffusion property, Probabilistic
encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
With ubiquitous digital images and digital media devices all over the world, the importance of image security
has been noticed and emphasized in recent years [1]. In the real world, digital cameras capture the real scene
in the format of digital images, and are widely used in many digital devices such as smart phones, IPADs, and
laptops. In the virtual world, digital images, including those taken from cameras, scanned documents or pictures,
and computer-aid virtual paintings and so on, are the most common elements within a webpage besides texts on the
World Wide Web. Due to extensive information within a digital image, divulged image contents sometimes cause
severe problems for its owner(s). In many cases, such information leakage seriously invades personal privacy, e.g.
the malicious spread of photos in personal online albums or patients’ medical diagnosis images, and furthermore
it may cause uncountable losses for a company or a nation, e.g. a secret product design for a company or a
governmental classified scanned document.
Conventionally, digital data is encrypted by bit-stream ciphers and block ciphers [2], [3], [4], [5]. The two
well-known block ciphers are the Digital Encryption Standard (DES) [4] and its successor Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [5]. A digital image is a specific type of digital data and can be encrypted by these conventional
ciphers. However, they are not ideal ciphers for digital images because of
• Insufficient large block size: digital images are normally of several kilobits (Kb) and megabits (Mb), while
conventional bit-stream/block ciphers commonly has a block size less than 256 bits.
• Neglect of the nature of digital images: digital images are of two-dimensional data, while conventional bit-
stream/block ciphers encrypt an image by indirectly encrypting a pixel sequence extracted from this image.
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The first defect implies the low efficiency of encrypting a digital image using a bit-stream/block cipher [1], [6],
[7]. The second defect implies that a pixel sequence of an image is of high information redundancy with a tilted
histogram and is distinctive from a common bit sequence input to a bit-stream/block cipher. Therefore, image
encryption should be adaptive to image properties and natures [1], [6].
In general, digital image encryption methods can be classified into two groups: perceptual-level and bit-level.
The perceptual-level image encryption methods intend to transform an image into a unrecognized one using a fast
algorithm, e.g. selective encryption techniques [8], [9], [10] and optical encryption techniques [11], [12], [13]. In
this case, images are believed to be valuable only within a certain time period e.g. a couple of hours. To some
extend, therefore, an encrypted image by using perceptual-level image encryption is insecure because it maybe
cracked after a sufficiently long time. In contrast, the bit-level image encryption aims to change an image into a
random-like one. In this situation, images are believed to be valuable for a quite long time period e.g. twenty years.
Nowadays, the bit-level image encryption methods are mainly based on chaotic systems [7], [6], [14], [15], [16],
[17]. Although many existing chaotic image encryption algorithms have several good properties for cryptography
security, they have defects in the following aspects regardless of the chaotic systems being used:
• A chaotic system is defined on real numbers while a cryptsystem is defined on finite numbers.
• A chaotic system may lose its chaotic nature completely and become periodic when it is decretized.
• A chaotic system’s parameters and initial values can be estimated by a number of existing tools and methods.
The first defect implies the difficulties of software and hardware implementation for a chaos-based image encryption
method because round-off errors in real number quantizations may lead nonreversible functions for encryption and
thus make the decryption process impossible [18]. The second defect implies a chaotic image encryption method
could be completely nonchaotic and thus vulnerable to attacks [19]. The third defect shows these chaotic image
encryption method may be broken using existing tools and methods after a long-term observation [20], [21]. Besides
chaotic image encryption methods, nonchaotic image encryption methods are also researched by using various
random-like patterns e.g. cellular automata [22], wave transmission model [15], Sudoku matrices [23], P-Fibonacci
transform [24], and magic cubes [25], [26]. Although nonchaotic image encryption methods eliminate drawbacks
of chaotic encryption methods especially those round-off errors, many of them do not have good confusion and
diffusion properties [27] as in chaotic encryption methods, due to the fact that the used random-like patterns are
not truly random-like.
To address above mentioned problems in bit-level image encryption, we introduce a new Latin square image
cipher in this paper. It is a nonchaotic image cipher and directly defined on finite numbers, and thus can be
effectively implemented with accuracy and ease in software and hardware. LSIC uses a 256-bit encryption key to
generate keyed Latin squares for encryption/decryption, whose key space is large enough to resist today’s brute force
attacks and could be expended to even larger sizes if needed. LSIC contains three Latin square based encryption
primitives, namely Latin Square Whitening, Latin Square Substitution and Latin Square Permutation, all of which
are dependent on a keyed 256 × 256 Latin square. Hence, LSIC is very sensitive to key changes. Further, these
encryption primitives construct LSIC in a SPN [28], a structure proven to be effective and efficient to encrypt images
with good confusion and diffusion properties [27]. In plus, we integrate the probabilistic encryption [29], [30] in
LSIC by embedding random noise in the least significant bit-plane of a plaintext image. Consequently, encrypting
a plaintext image multiple times will generate distinctive ciphertext images even though the encryption key is
unchanged. This property helps LSIC to achieve a higher level of security and it completely prevents an adversary
to sense identical plaintext images by observing identical ciphertext images. We demonstrate the robustness and
effectiveness of LSIC using extensive theoretical analysis, simulation results and comparisons to peer algorithms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II gives a brief review on preliminary materials. Section III
introduces the new Latin square image cipher including its key schedule, probabilistic encryption, and Latin square
based encryption primitives. Section IV discusses the simulation database information, extensive simulations results
and cipher encryption and decryption speed, Section V analyzes the cipher security theoretically and experimentally
under various attacks, and finally Section VI concludes the paper and give discussions on open questions in LSIC.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Latin Squares
A Latin square of order N is an N×N array filled with a symbol set of N distinctive elements, with each symbol
appears exactly once in each row and each column. The name Latin Square is motivated by the mathematician
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Leonhard Euler, who used Latin characters as symbols.
Mathematically, we can define a Latin square L of order N via a tri-tuple function fL of (r, c, i) as follows
fL(r, c, i) =
{
1 , L(r, c) = Si
0 , Otherwise
(1)
where r denotes the row index of an element in L with r ∈ N = {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}; c denote the column indx of
an element in L with c ∈ N; i denotes the symbol index of an element in L with I ∈ N; and Si is the ith symbol
in the symbol set S = {S0, S1, · · · , SN−1}.
Therefore, if L is a Latin square of order N , then
• for arbitrary c, i ∈ N, we have
N−1∑
r=0
fL(r, c, i) = 1 (2)
• for arbitrary r, i ∈ N, we have
N−1∑
c=0
fL(r, c, i) = 1 (3)
which implies that each symbol appears exactly once in each row and each column in L.
Fig. 1 shows examples of Latin squares at different orders with various symbol sets. It is worthwhile to note
that the popular Sudoku puzzle [31], [23] is also a special case of Latin square with additional block constraint as
shown in Fig. 1(d).
(a) 3× 3 (b) 4× 4 (c) 5× 5 (d) 9× 9
Fig. 1. Latin square examples
Throughout of the paper, we are interested in N × N Latin squares with the symbol set of integers from 0 to
N − 1, i.e. S = {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}.
B. Latin Square Generator
Although Latin squares can be generated via a variety of means, for the sake of simplicity we use Algorithm 1
described below for Latin square generation in the paper.
Algorithm 1. A Latin Square Generator L = LSG(Q1, Q2)
Require: Q1 and Q2 are two length-N sequences
Ensure: L is a Latin square of order N
Qseed = SortMap(Q1)
Qshift = SortMap(Q2)
for r = 0 : 1 : N − 1 do
L(r, :) = RowShift(Qseed, Qshift(r))
end for
In Algorithm 1, both Q1 and Q2 are length-N sequences from a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), e.g.
Linear Congruential Generators (LCG) [32]; SortMap(Q) is a function which finds the index mapping between
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a sequence Q and its sorted version Q∗ in the ascending order; and RowShift(Q, v) ring shifts the sequence Q
with v elements towards left.
For example, if we want to generate a 4× 4 Latin square L with
Q1 = [.1, .6, .9, .7] and Q2 = [.3, .9, .4, .2]
Then function SortMap(.) first calculates the sorted version of the input sequence and obtains
Q∗1 = [.1, .6, .7, .9] and Q
∗
2 = [.2, .3, .4, .9]
it then compares Q1 with Q∗1 and Q2 with Q∗2 and obtains the element mapping sequences as
Qseed = SortMap(Q1) = [0, 1, 3, 2]
and
Qshift = SortMap(Q2) = [3, 0, 2, 1]
, where the permutation sequences Qseed and Qshift indicate for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
Q∗1 (Qseed(i)) = Q1 (i) and Q
∗
2 (Qshift(i)) = Q2 (i)
Finally, function RowShift(Q, v) left shifts Qseed with the amount v = Qshift(r) indicated by the rth element in
Qshift, and assign this row to be the rth row in L. We therefore have the 4× 4 Latin square L:
L =

2 0 1 3
0 1 3 2
3 2 0 1
1 3 2 0

whose 1st row is obtained by left shifting Qseed for 3 units; 2nd row is obtained by left shifting Qseed for 0 unit;
3rd row is obtained by left shifting Qseed for 3 units; and 4th row is obtained by left shifting Qseed for 1 unit. It
is noticeable that this shifting amount sequence {3, 0, 2, 1} is indeed Qshift.
C. Substitution-Permutation Network
In cryptography, an input message and its corresponding output message of a cryptsystem are referred to as
plaintext and ciphertext, respectively. A substitution-permutation network is a cipher structure composed of a
number of substitution and permutation ciphers with multiple iterations. This structure is widely used in many
well-known block ciphers, e.g. Rijndael i.e. AES [5], and ensures good confusion and diffusion properties [27].
Fig. 2. A M -round substitution-permutation network for block ciphers
A typical M -round SPN for block ciphers has a structure shown in Fig. 2. Conventionally in a SPN, plaintext,
commonly in the form of a bit stream and denoted as P , is the original message to be encrypted; Key Whitening
denotes an operation to mix the plaintext P with a round key; S-Box denotes a substitution-box, which maps one
input byte to another in a deterministic way; P-Box denotes a permutation-box, which shuffles bit positions within
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the input bit stream in a deterministic way; and ciphertext denotes the output bit stream C, which is an encrypted
message by the SPN. The decryption process of a SPN cipher is simply to reverse the arrow directions of all
processing and to use inverse S-Box, and inverse P-Box instead.
The classic SPN ciphers are able to obtain good Shannon’s confusion and diffusion properties [27]. For the
diffusion property: if one changes one bit in plaintext P , the corresponding ciphertext C changes in many bits.
This one-bit change results in a different byte after passing through a S-Box, then leads more byte changes after
passing through a P-Box, so on and so forth in each cipher round. Finally, one-bit change leads to significant changes
in ciphertext C. The confusion property is the similar to the diffusion property. One bit change in encryption key
K, will spread over all bits and result significant changes in ciphertext C.
D. Psychovisual Redundancy in Image
As a typical type of two-dimensional data, digital images contain many kinds of redundancies [33]: 1) coding
redundancy, which requires to express a pixel with the number of bits than the optimal number; 2) temporal or
spatial redundancy, which implies strong correlations between pixels within a neighborhood; and 3) psychovisual
redundancy, which is visually negligible details in the human vision system. The first two redundancies about
real visual information are commonly removed by lossless compression techniques, such as Huffman coding and
lossless predictive coding. In contrast, psychovisual redundancy within an image is not essential for normal visual
processing, and thus it is commonly removed by lossy compression techniques, such as quantization techniques
used in JPEG [34]. Besides image compression, psychovisual redundancy is also commonly used for data hiding,
especially for the least significant bit-plane (LSB) data hiding techniques [35], [36], [37], which encode secret
information within these unintelligible redundancies for human visual perception.
Fig. 3 shows an example of using the psychovisual redundancy for data hiding in the least significant image
bit-plane. The secret embedded image Fig. 3-(c) contains identical bit-planes to those in the original image -(a) ,
except its least significant bit-plane is modified by bitwise XORing OLSB and secrete binary image I . As can be
seen from this example, the secret embedded image is visually indistinguishable from the original one, although
the least significant bit-plane has been dramatically changed.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 3. Psychovisual redundancy used in LSB data hiding - (a) original image Lenna O; (b) OLSB ; (c) secret embedded image E; (d)
ELSB ; and (e) secret information I = OLSB
⊕
ELSB .
Consequently, psychovisual redundancy in an image provides us a feasible way of introducing true randomness
in an image without harming the image visual quality and expanding the image size for image encryption. More
details are discussed in future sections.
III. LATIN SQUARE IMAGE CIPHER
A. Overview
To standardize the encryption/decryption processing, the cipher processing block is set to a 256× 256 grayscale
block, i.e. its pixel intensity is denoted as a 8-bit byte. In the rest of the paper, we use P to denote a 256 × 256
plaintext image block, C to denote a corresponding ciphertext image block of P , L to denote a keyed Latin square
of order 256, and K to denote a 256-bit encryption key.
The new proposed Latin square image cipher is of a SPN structure with eight rounds as shown in Fig. 4.
It is composed of the probabilistic encryption stage noise embedding in LSB and the SPN stage containing
three encryption primitives Latin Square Whitening, Latin Square Substitution and Latin Square Permutation. It
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is worthwhile to note that this SPN is of a loom-like structure designed for image data, which encrypts plaintext
image along rows and columns iteratively. In the rest of this section, we will discuss these stages and the detail
encryption/decryption algorithms for LSIC.
(a)
Fig. 4. Overview of the Latin square image cipher
B. LSB Noise Embedding
Probabilistic encryption [38], [39] means to use randomness in a cipher, so that this cipher is able to encrypt
one plaintext with the exact same encryption key to distinctive ciphertexts. It is well known that such randomness
is crucial to achieve semantic security [40].
In this paper, we introduce such randomness by embedding noise in the least significant bit-plane of an image.
More specifically, we XOR a randomly generated 256 × 256 bit-plane with the least significant bit-plane of the
plaintext image, where the generation of this random bit-plane is completely independent of the encryption key.
Fig. 5 shows an example of LSB noise embedding. Once again, these introduced noise in LSB does not affect
any image visual quality from the point view of human visual perceptibility. However, any slight change in plaintext
here will lead to significant changes in ciphertext after it is encrypted by by the SPN.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5. Noise embedding in LSB - (a) plaintext Lenna P with histogram (b) noise embedded plaintext P ′ with histogram, and (c) |P −P ′|
with the difference of histograms
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C. Key Translation
In conventional block ciphers, keys are directly used without translation, e.g. in key whitening process, but the
proposed LSIC uses a 256-bit encryption key K with key translation to eight key-dependent Latin squares of order
256 before using in LSIC. Specifically speaking, for a given 256-bit encryption key K, we
1) Divide the encryption key K using function SubKeyDiv into eight 32-bit subkeys, i.e.
K = [k0, k1, · · · , k7]
2) Generate pairs of pseudo-random sequences (Q01, Q
0
2), (Q
1
1, Q
1
2), · · · , (Q81, Q82), each pair with 2 × 256 ele-
ments by using PRNGs by feeding these subkeys as seeds.
3) Generate key-dependent Latin squares i.e. L0, L1, · · · , L8 with the order of 256 by feeding these pseudo-
random sequences in Algorithm 1. Namely, ∀n ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 8}, we have
Ln = LSG(Q
n
1 , Q
n
2 )
The first two steps can be realized via Algorithm 2 with encryption key K and M = 8.
Algorithm 2. Key Dependent Sequence Generator (Q1,Q2) = KDSG(Key,M)
Require: K is a 256-bit key
Require: n is a nonnegative integer
Ensure: Q1 = {Q01, · · · , QM1 } and Q2 = {Q02, · · · , QM2 } are n-element set of random sequences, each of a length 256.
K0 = K
for n = 0 : 1 :M do
[k0, k1, · · · , k7] = SubKeyDiv(Kn)
for i = 0 : 1 : 8 do
qi(0) = PRNG(ki)
1
for j = 1 : 1 : 63 do
qi(j) = PRNG(qi(j − 1))
end for
end for
Qn1 =
[
q0(0 : 31), q1(0 : 31), · · · , q7(0 : 31)] %2
Qn2 =
[
q0(32 : 63), q1(32 : 63), · · · , q7(32 : 63)]
Kn+1 =
[
q0(63), q1(63), · · · , q7(63)]
end for
All PRNGs can be used in Algorithm 2, but not all of them are secure for cryptography, for example, the linear
congruential generator [32]. Using cryptographic secure PRNGs in Algorithm 2 can further enhance the cipher
security, for example, PRNGs from eSTREAM project 3 with nonce [41].
D. Latin Square Whitening
In the conventional SPN for block ciphers, the Whitening stage normally mixes a plaintext message P with a
round key, e.g. XOR operation in [4], [5], such that
• The statistics of the plaintext message P is redistributed after mixing.
• The relationship between ciphertext and encryption key is very complicated and involved.
In image encryption, a plaintext message is an image block, P , composed of a number of pixels. Each pixel is
represented by several binary bits (a byte). Therefore, XOR whitening scheme become inefficient for image data, in
the sense that it requires to extend an encryption key to be a equal size to a plaintext image, and to impose bitwise
XOR to byte pixels. And this type of image encryption is called a naive algorithm in [42]. Since the objective of
key whitening is to mix plaintext data with encryption keys, we therefore define whitening as a transposition cipher
[43] over the finite field GF (28) for image data, as shown in Eq. (4)
y = [x+ l]28 (4)
1Any PRNG can be used here by taking the key as its seed.
2qi(j1 : j2) denotes a vector of pseudo-random numbers with elements [qi(j1), qi(j1 + 1), · · · , qi(j2 − 1), qi(j2)].
3The eSTREAM project is available under http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/ as the date of 04/10/2012.
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where x is a byte in plaintext, l is a corresponding byte in the keyed Latin square, y is the whitening result and
[.]28 denotes the computations over GF (28). Above whitening process can be easily reversed by applying Eq. (5).
x = [y + l]28 (5)
In image encryption, plaintext byte x is a pixel, say it is located at the intersection of rth row and cth column
i.e. x = P (r, c). Now let l = L(r, c) be an element located at the corresponding position in the keyed Latin square
L, and y be the ciphertext byte with y = C(r, c), then we have the pixel-level equation{
C(r, c) = [SR (P (r, c), [D]3) + L(r, c)]28
P (r, c) = SR ([C(r, c) + L(r, c)]28 , [D]3)
(6)
where symbol n denotes the current round number (n ∈ [0, 7]), D = L(0, 0) is the rotating parameter, and SR
denotes the spatial rotating function (X, d) rotates an image X according to different values of the direction d as
defined in Eq. (7)
Y = SR(X, d) =

X, if d = 0
Flip X up→ down, if d = 1
Flip X left→ right, if d = 2
(7)
Notice that if Y =SR(X, d), then the following identity always holds
X = SR(Y, d) (8)
Apply key whitening for all pixels using the pixel-level Eq. (6), the Latin Square Whitening(LSW) in the image-
level then can be denoted as
LSW :
{
C = Ecrw(L,P,D)
P = Dcrw(L,C,D)
(9)
Therefore, we can restore the plaintext image block P from the ciphertext image block C using Eq. (9).
Fig. 6 shows an example of Latin Square Whitening, where the first row shows images and the second row shows
corresponding histograms of these images. From this example, it is easy to verify that the ciphertext image after
the Latin Square Whitening is unrecognizable and its pixels are redistributed to uniform-like.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 6. A Latin Square Whitening example - (a) plaintext Lenna P , (b) reference Latin square L, and (c) ciphertext C = Ecrw(L,P, 0)
E. Latin Square Row and Column Bijections
Since Eqs. (2) and (3) hold, each row and each column in a Latin square L of order N is a permutation of the
integer number sequence [0, 1, · · · , N − 1], we can define bijections (one-to-one and onto mapping) by mapping
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Fig. 7. Examples of building forward row mappings and forward column mappings using a Latin square
this integer number sequence to either a row or a column in a Latin square, which is a permutated sequence of
the integer number sequence. In other words, we are able to construct forward and inverse row mapping functions
(FRM and IRM) with respect to the rth row in L as shown in Eq. (10), and also forward and inverse column
mapping functions (FCM and ICM) with respect to the cth column in L as shown in Eq. (11), where x and y
denote the input and output of the mapping functions, respectively.{
y = FRM(L, r, x) = L(r, x)
x = IRM(L, r, y) = argmax
z∈N
(fL(r, z, y))
(10)
{
y = FCM(L, x, c) = L(x, c)
x = ICM(L, y, c) = argmax
z∈N
(fL(z, c, y))
(11)
where fL is the tri-tuple function defined in Eq. (1). Its maximum is equal to 1, i.e. fL(r, x, y) = 1, only for the
column number x satisfying the constraint, L(r, x) = y. Further, we have row mapping identities hold for arbitrary
x and y within a Latin square L: {
IRM(L, r, FRM(L, r, x)) = x
FRM(L, r, IRM(L, r, y)) = y
(12)
Similarly, we also have column mapping identities as follows:{
ICM(L,FCM(L, x, c), c) = x
FCM(L, ICM(L, y, c), c) = y
(13)
Fig. 7 shows FRM and FCM functions defined by a Latin square. As can be seen, given a row number r, the
effect of forward row mapping is to use this Latin square as a look-up table and to find the corresponding element
in row r. Similarly, given a column number c, the effect of forward column mapping to use this Latin square
as a look-up table and to find the corresponding element in column c. Such nice property is directly from the
constructional constraint in a Latin square.
Since a N th order Latin square has N rows and N columns, there are N bijections from N rows and another N
bijections from N columns in the Latin square. It is well-known that a bijection can be directly used as a P-Box
[28] and can also serve as a S-Box [28]. We therefore are able to construct S-Boxes and P-Boxes from a Latin
square.
F. Latin Square Substitution
An S-Box in cryptography is a basic component performing byte substitution. Each S-Box can be defined as
a bijection, also known as a one-to-one and onto mapping. In image encryption, an image pixel is commonly
represented as a byte, i.e. a sequence of bits. For example, 8-bit grayscale image has 256 gray intensity scales with
each intensity scale represented in an 8-bit sequence.
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Because of the existence of FRM/IRM and FCM/ICM bijections in a Latin square, we are able to perform byte
substitution in an image cipher using bijections from rows and columns in a Latin square. The substitution with
respect to a row in a Latin square is called Latin Square Row S-box(LSRS) in this paper:
LSRS :
{
C = Ecrrows (L,P )
P = Dcrrows (L,C)
(14)
In regard to pixel-level function of LSRS, each ciphertext byte is determined by the FRM function (see Eq. (10))
using the keyed Latin square L with function parameters given by plaintext bytes and ciphertext bytes as follows
Ecrrows : C(r, c) =
{
FRM (L,C(r − 1, c), P (r, c)) , if r 6= 0
FRM (L, 0, P (r, c)) , if r = 0
(15)
Clearly, plaintext bytes then can be perfectly restored from ciphertext bytes, if we use IRM instead of FRM as
follows
Dcrrows : P (r, c) =
{
IRM (L,C(r − 1, c), C(r, c)) , if r 6= 0
IRM (L, 0, C(r, c)) , if r = 0
(16)
Similarly, we use bijections from columns in a Latin square to perform byte substitutions. And this is called
Latin Square Column S-box(LSCS) i.e.
LSCS :
{
C = Ecrcols (L,P )
P = Dcrcols (L,C)
(17)
and the corresponding LSCS encryption and decryption process then can be defined as:
Ecrcols : C(r, c) =
{
FCM (L,P (r, c), C(r, c− 1)) , if c 6= 0
FCM (L,P (r, c), 0) , if c = 0
(18)
Dcrcols P (r, c) =
{
ICM (L,C(r, c), C(r, c− 1)) , if c 6= 0
ICM (L,C(r, c), 0) , if c = 0
(19)
Fig. 8 shows encryption results of Latin Square Row S-box and Latin Square Column S-box. As can be seen,
the plaintext image block P becomes unrecognizable after applying either LSRS or LSCS. Histogram analysis also
shows that the statistics of the pixel intensity changes dramatically after substitution.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 8. A Latin Square Substitution example - (a) plaintext P : Lenna Image, (b) Latin square L, (c) ciphertext Cr = Ecrrows (L,P ), and
(d) Ciphertext Cc = Ecrcols (L,P )
The Latin square row/column substitution defined above has excellent diffusion properties. One pixel change
in the plaintext P will diffuse to a column/row of pixels after a round of LSRS or LSCS. This diffusion quickly
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spreads to the entire ciphertext image in several cipher rounds.
G. Latin Square Permutation
Unlike a S-Box performing byte substitution, a P-Box performs byte shuffling or scrambling. Each P-Box can
also be defined as a bijection [28].
If we consider both input x and output y in FRM and IRM as indices (see Eq. (10)), then FRM defines a mapping
{0, 1, · · · , 255} → {0, 1, · · · , 255} and IRM defines the corresponding inverse mapping. We therefore are able to
define the Latin square row p-box (LSRP) with respect to rows in a Latin square L as follows,
LSRP :
{
C(r, cy) = P (r, FRM(L, r, cx))
P (r, cx) = C (r, IRM(L, r, cy))
(20)
where cx and cy denotes the column indices before and after mapping. Consequently, for any pixel in P and its
corresponding pixel in C are in the same row r after LSRP; and only column indices change before and after
mapping with relationship cy = FRM(L, r, cx) holds.
Similarly, we can also construct Latin Square Column P-box(LSCP) with respect to columns in a Latin square
as
LSCP :
{
C(ry, c) = P (FCM(L, rx, c), c)
P (rx, c) = C (ICM(L, ry, c), c)
(21)
In order to achieve better performance, we construct our Latin Square Permutation by cascading LSRPs s and
LSCPs as follows
C(r, c) = C∗(FCM(L, r, c), c) (22)
C∗(r, c) = P (r, FRM(L, r, c)) (23)
In general, we write this Latin Square Permutationfunction as
LSP :
{
C = Ecrp(L,P )
P = Dcrp(L,C)
(24)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 9. A Latin Square Permutation example - (a) plaintext Lenna P , (b) Latin square L, (c) ciphertext with only LSRP, (d) ciphertext
with only LSCP, and (e) ciphertext with LSP C = Ecrp(L,P )
Fig. 9 shows permutation results of using LSRP, LSCP and LSP. It is clear that cascading LSRP and LSCP in
LSP helps LSP to achieve a better pixel permutation performance in the sense that, pixels in its ciphertext image
become more random-like and make the ciphertext image content unintelligible.
H. Encryption/Decryption Algorithms
After constructing Latin square based encryption primitives for image data, we now are able to construct the
SPN cipher as shown in Fig. 4. Algorithm 3 and 4 describe the encryption and decryption process of the Latin
square image cipher, respectively.
4LSBNoiseEmbedding could be any function to embed random binary noise in the least significant bit-plane of a plaintext image, e.g. a
function randomly change the parity of a plaintext pixel on its LSB.
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Algorithm 3. Latin Square Image Cipher- Encryption C = E(P,K)
Require: K is a 256-bit key
Require: P is a 256× 256 8-bit grayscale image block
Ensure: C is a 256× 256 8-bit grayscale image block
(Q1,Q2) = KDSG(K, 8)
for n = 0 : 1 : 7 do
if n == 0 then
CLSP = LSBNoiseEmbedding(P )4
end if
Ln = LSG(Qn1 , Q
n
2 )
Dn = Ln(0, 0)
CLSW = Ecrw(Ln, CLSP , Dn)
if mod(n, 2) 6= 0 then
CLSS = Ecr
col
s (Ln, CLSW )
else
CLSS = Ecr
row
s (Ln, CLSW )
end if
CLSP = Ecrp(Ln, CLSS)
end for
L8 = LSG(Q81, Q
8
2)
D8 = L8(0, 0)
C = Ecrw(L8, CLSP , Dn)
Algorithm 4. Latin Square Image Cipher- Decryption P = D(C,K)
Require: K is a 256-bit key
Require: C is a 256× 256 8-bit grayscale image block
Ensure: P is a 256× 256 8-bit grayscale image block
(Q1,Q2) = KDSG(K, 8)
for n = 7 : −1 : 0 do
if n == 7 then
L8 = LSG(Q81, Q
8
2)
D8 = L8(0, 0)
PLSW = Dcrw(L8, C,D8)
end if
Ln = LSG(Qn1 , Q
n
2 )
Dn = Ln(0, 0)
PLSP = Decp(Ln, PLSW )
if mod(n, 2) 6= 0 then
PLSS = Dcr
col
s (Ln, PLSP )
else
PLSS = Dcr
row
s (Ln, PLSP )
end if
PLSW = Dcrw(Ln, PLSS , Dn)
end for
P = PLSW
I. Discussion
Our design criteria behind the Latin Square Substitution are to achieve the following objectives,
1) A ciphertext image is very sensitive to any slight change in a plaintext image.
2) A deciphered image is insensitive to slight change in a ciphertext image.
In practice, Latin Square Substitution is of an asymmetric structure as shown in Fig. 10, in the sense that encrypting
one plaintext byte requires one plaintext byte and one ciphertext byte, while decrypting one ciphertext byte requires
two ciphertext byte but no plaintext byte. This process is similar to weave a thread of ciphertext bytes on the
ciphertext image, which has to be done by intersecting the longitudinal threads of plaintext bytes. As a result,
changing one pixel in a plaintext image influence all pixels after it in its row in the first encryption round, further
all pixels after these influenced pixels in corresponding columns in the second encryption round, and then more
pixels in the third encryption round, so on and so forth until the last round. As a result, this small change in
plaintext image will lead to a completely different ciphertext image. In contrast, changing one pixel in a ciphertext
image only leads a two-pixel-change in the first decryption round, and at most 28 = 256 pixel changes in the
deciphered image. Hence the Latin Square Substitution indeed achieves both goals above and gains encryption
diffusion properties against plaintext change and decryption robustness against ciphertext noise simultaneously.
More results and examples about these two abilities will be discussed in future sections.
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Fig. 10. Latin Square Substitution has an asymmetric structure for encryption and decryption
The proposed Latin square image cipher is carefully designed with respect to image data. We use the psychovisual
redundancy within an image and realize the probabilistic encryption by introducing random noise in the LSB of a
plaintext image block. We also notice the information redundancy within adjacent image pixels, which might lead
to information leakage by estimating a pixel’s intensity from its neighbors. We break these high correlated neighbor
pixels by applying Latin Square Whitening, which shifts pixels within a homogenous region to random-like in the
sense that shifting amounts of any two highly correlated pixels within a row or a column in the homogenous region
are always different. This way prevents the prediction of a pixel’s intensity from its neighbors and thus decorrelates
these pixels. In addition, Latin Square Whitening also allows to spatial transform a plaintext image in a random-like
manner. Further our proposed Latin Square Substitution substitutes pixel bytes along rows and columns iteratively
like weaving in a loom, if we consider a row of pixels is a longitudinal thread and a column of pixels is a latitudinal
thread. Finally Latin Square Permutation shuffles plaintext image pixels all over the domain. In summary the SPN
used in LSIC differs from the conventional SPN block cipher [28] in:
• Cipher Object: LSIC is designed for two-dimensional images while a conventional SPN block cipher works
for one-dimensional bit streams.
• Processing Unit: LSIC processes image data byte by byte while a SPN block cipher encrypts data bit by bit.
• Cipher Structure: LSIC is of a loom-like processing, which includes spatial flipping and iterative substitution
along rows and columns.
• Parametric Processes: LSIC generates dynamic Latin Square Whitening, S-Box and P-Box while processes in
a SPN block cipher are static and key independent.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Experiment Settings and Dataset
We perform the following simulations using a computer under MATLAB R2010a environment with a Windows
7 Operating System, 6Gb memory and Intel Core2 2.66GHz CPU. Test images are from the Miscellaneous dataset
in the USC-SIPI image database5. The detailed information about these test images are listed in Table I.
Although we believe the performance of an image cipher should be tested over a fairly large dataset, e.g. the USC
SIPI Miscellaneous dataset, the analysis of many peer image encryption methods are merely about a small number
of test images e.g. Lenna image. Therefore, we perform fair comparisons between the proposed LSIC and peer
methods [6], [14], [15], [16], [17], [44], [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], [50], [51], [52], [53], [54]. in three following
aspects:
• If peer methods have performance reports on Lenna image, we compare the performance of LSIC with those
methods on the identical Lenna image.
• If peer methods have the accessible source code (Mao et al. 2004 [6]) or the executive file (e.g. bmpPacker6)
online, we compare the performance of these methods with LSIC over the entire Miscellaneous dataset.
• If peer methods have performance reports also on the entire Miscellaneous dataset already (Pareek et al. ,
2006 [54]), we directly cite these reports for comparisons.
Furthermore, we turn off LSBNoiseEmbedding function in all simulations because we want to:
5USC-SIPI image database is a public image database held by the University of South California, available at http://sipi.usc.edu/database/
as the date of 04/10/2012.
6bmpPacker is an encryption software containing many classic block ciphers written by Jens Go¨deke. Only its AES cipher is used in our
simulations. This freeware is available on: http://www.jens-goedeke.eu/tools/bmppacker/ as the date of 04/10/2012.
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Fig. 11. USC-SIPI Miscellanous dataset
TABLE I
USC-SIPI Miscellaneous DATASET INFORMATION
File Description Size Type
4.1.01 Girl 256 Color
4.1.02 Couple 256 Color
4.1.03 Girl 256 Color
4.1.04 Girl 256 Color
4.1.05 House 256 Color
4.1.06 Tree 256 Color
4.1.07 Jelly beans 256 Color
4.1.08 Jelly beans 256 Color
4.2.01 Splash 512 Color
4.2.02 Girl (Tiffany) 512 Color
4.2.03 Mandrill (a.k.a. Baboon) 512 Color
4.2.04 Girl (Lena, or Lenna) 512 Color
4.2.05 Airplane (F-16) 512 Color
4.2.06 Sailboat on lake 512 Color
4.2.07 Peppers 512 Color
5.1.09 Moon surface 256 Gray
5.1.10 Aerial 256 Gray
5.1.11 Airplane 256 Gray
5.1.12 Clock 256 Gray
5.1.13 Resolution chart 256 Gray
5.1.14 Chemical plant 256 Gray
5.2.08 Couple 512 Gray
5.2.09 Aerial 512 Gray
5.2.10 Stream and bridge 512 Gray
5.3.01 Man 1024 Gray
5.3.02 Airport 1024 Gray
7.1.01 Truck 512 Gray
7.1.02 Airplane 512 Gray
7.1.03 Tank 512 Gray
7.1.04 Car and APCs 512 Gray
7.1.05 Truck and APCs 512 Gray
7.1.06 Truck and APCs 512 Gray
7.1.07 Tank 512 Gray
7.1.08 APC 512 Gray
7.1.09 Tank 512 Gray
7.1.10 Car and APCs 512 Gray
7.2.01 Airplane (U-2) 1024 Gray
boat.512 Fishing Boat 512 Gray
elaine.512 Girl (Elaine) 512 Gray
house House 512 Color
gray21.512 21 level step wedge 512 Gray
numbers.512 256 level test pattern 512 Gray
ruler.512 Pixel ruler 512 Gray
testpat.1k General test pattern 1024 Gray
• prevent the possible unfair comparisons, because other compared algorithms donot have this stage
• separate the influences brought by these embedded random noises from Latin square encryption primitives
However, the probabilistic encryption integrated in the LSIC does enhance the cipher security, because without this
stage the two ciphertext images C1 and C2 by encrypting a plaintext image P twice with a key K are always
identical,i.e. C1 = C2, which provides an adversary plaintext information from ciphertext information that he/she
should never know. In contrast, LSIC with LSB Noise Embedding is able to encrypt a plaintext image to distinctive
ciphertext images because of the embedded noise from time to time are not necessarily the same and thus completely
prevent the risk of information leakage in the deterministic encryption.
B. Simulation Results
Image encryption results using the proposed Latin square image cipher are shown in Fig. 12. As can be seen,
the proposed LSIC is able to
• generate unintelligible ciphertext images no matter what contents or types of the plaintext images;
• make the statistics of ciphertext images to be uniform-like;
• perfectly reconstruct the plaintext images from the corresponding ciphertext images.
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It is also worthwhile to note that the test images 5.1.13, ruler.512 and testpat.1k are very difficult cases for image
encryption because they have large size homogeneous regions, i.e. they have extremely tilted histograms. However,
the proposed Latin square image cipher encrypts those two images successfully.
In regard to encryption speed, the proposed Latin square image cipher is able to encrypt each 256× 256 image
block (pixel in 8-bit byte) with 1.2331±0.10089 seconds for all test images pulled from the USC-SIPI Miscellaneous
dataset under the MATLAB implementation. Therefore, roughly speaking, the encryption/decryption speed of the
proposed Latin square image cipher about 0.415Mb/s (Megabits per second) or equivalently 3.32Mb/s per round
under MATLAB. In regard to decryption speed, the proposed Latin square image cipher is able to decrypt each
256× 256 image block (pixel in 8-bit byte) with 0.7137± 0.06222 seconds (equivalently 5.74Mb/s per round) for
all test encrypted images from the USC-SIPI Miscellaneous dataset. The decryption speed is faster than encryption
because Latin Square S-boxes defined in Eqs. (14) and (17) are asymmetric for encryption and decryption (see Fig.
10).
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A good image encryption algorithm/cipher should be able to resist all known types of attacks and cryptanalysis.
Its performance should be independent of a used encryption key and a plaintext image. First of all, this cipher should
be theoretically secure against known attacks. Secondly, a good image encryption algorithm/cipher should have both
confusion property and diffusion property, which are proposed in [27] as criteria for secure ciphers. The confusion
property implies the cipher ability to encrypt an arbitrary plaintext image into random-like ciphertext, so that an
adversary cannot extract any information about the plaintext image from ciphertext images. The diffusion property
implies the cipher has capability to diffuse even a slight change in a plaintext image over the entire ciphertext
image. Furthermore, a good image encryption algorithm/cipher should also be secure with respect to attacks against
encryption keys [28] and robust under noisy environment [24]. In this section, we discuss the security of the
proposed LSIC under all above analysis and deeply study the LSIC performance with extensive simulation results
and comparisons.
A. Theoretical Analysis
1) Brute-Force Attack: In cryptography, a brute-force attack, or exhaustive key search, is a strategy that is able
to crack any encrypted data by searching all possible keys in the key space until the right key is found. It is well
known that the key length, i.e. the size of the key space used in an encryption system, determines the practical
feasibility of performing a brute-force attack: longer keys means more difficulties than shorter ones in the terms of
the time complexity.
The proposed Latin square image cipher has a key space of 256 bits, which is larger than or equal to the
mainstream cipher standards such as DES [4] and AES [5], where the later one 192-bit key is known to be large
enough to resist brute-force attacks. Therefore, the proposed Latin square image cipher also has a sufficient large
key space against brute-force attack.
It is worthwhile to note the theoretical key space of the proposed Latin square image cipher has a even larger
key space than 256-bit. As stated in Section III, the proposed cipher depends on eight 256 × 256 Latin squares.
Regardless of all other methods for generating these Latin square, consider the Latin square generator in Algorithm
1 where a Latin square is uniquely determined by two length 256 permutation sequence, then it is not difficult to
see that the number of Latin squares can be generated by Algorithm 1 is 256! × 256! ≈ 23368. Consequently, the
theoretical key size allowed in the cipher is about (23368)8 = 226944, i.e. about 26944 bits. This implies that the
adopted key length in the Latin square image cipher can be easily increased to against brute-force attacks in future,
when the current 256-bit key length is no longer long enough. Therefore, the proposed Latin square image cipher
has a extremely large key space to against brute-force attacks.
2) Ciphertext and Plaintext Attacks: In cryptography, ciphertext and plaintext are commonly used in attack
models to analyze the security of an encryption system. Specifically speaking, we consider a ciphertext-only attack
assuming that an adversary is only able to access a set of ciphertext, a known plaintext attack assuming that an
adversary is able to access a set of plaintexts and corresponding ciphertexts, and a chose-plaintext attack assuming
that an adversary is able to access arbitrary plaintexts to be encrypted and obtains the corresponding ciphertexts. As
can be seen from attack assumptions, the chosen-plaintext attack awards an adversary the most information about
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Fig. 12. Sample results of encrypting and decrypting images using the Latin square image cipher (1st column: plaintext images; 2nd column:
histograms of plaintext images; 3rd column: ciphertext images; 4th column: histograms of ciphertext images; and 5th column: decipertedtext
images.)
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plaintexts and ciphertexts among the three attack models. Therefore, if a cipher is able to resist chosen-plaintext
attacks, then it is also immune to ciphertext-only and known-plaintext attacks.
The proposed Latin square image cipher has good resistance to chosen-plaintext attacks because of three reasons
listed below:
• Nonlinear Key Translation: instead of directly applying the key the cipher for encryption in a conventional
block cipher, e.g. key whitening, an encryption key used in the proposed Latin square image cipher is first
translated to eight 256× 256 Latin squares and then used for contructing key dependent encryption primitives
for image encryption. Therefore, the relation between the key and ciphertext is more involved and complicated
than the conventional key usage.
• Probabilistic Encryption: the proposed Latin square image cipher has a pre-process realizing probabilistic
encryption by introducing a small amount of noise to the LSB of a plaintext image. As a result, the cipher is
able to generate significantly different ciphertext images even when the key and the plaintext image are both
unchanged, but to leave deciphered images visually unchanged. This way helps the Latin square image cipher
achieves semantically secure [40].
• Dynamic S-boxes and P-boxes: Since all S-boxes and P-boxes used in the Latin square image cipher are
dependent on Latin squares used in each round, they are dynamic instead of fixed. This fact implies that even
if an adversary is able to crack an encryption key, all other keys are still safe because P-boxes and S-boxes
associated with these keys are unbroken. As a result, ciphertext images encrypted by other keys are still safe.
Therefore, the proposed Latin square image cipher has good resistance to these ciphertext and pliantext attacks.
B. Confusion Property Analysis
The confusion property [27] of a secure cipher emphasizes the ability of making the relationship between the key
and the ciphertext as complex and involved as possible. If a cipher has good confusion property, it is very difficult
to find the encryption key, even if a large number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs produced by the same encryption key
are available for an adversary. In other words, a cipher with good confusion property should have good resistances
to known-plaintext attacks [28] and ciphertext-only attacks [28]. To demonstrate the excellent confusion property
of the proposed Latin square image cipher, we perform two types of statistical analysis: entropy and correlation.
1) Entropy Analysis: Information entropy is a quantitative measurement of how random a signal is. Because a
digital image is a type of digital signal. The entropy analysis can be used to measure the randomness of a test
image. The information entropy of an image can be defined as Eq. (25), where X denotes the test image, xi denotes
the ith possible value in X , and Pr(xi) is the probability of X = xi, i.e. the probability of pulling a random pixel in
X and its value is xi. The maximum of H(X) is achieved when X is uniformly distributed as shown in Eq. (26),
i.e. X has a complete flat histogram and the symbol F denotes the number of allowed intensity scales associated
with the image format. For example, F = 256 is the number of intensity scales of a grayscale image or a RGB
color image.
H(X) = −
n∑
i=1
Pr(xi) log2 Pr(xi) (25)
Pr(X = xi) = 1/F (26)
For the test images in Table I, F = 256 and therefore the upper-bound of information entropy is 8. The comparison
results of information entropy between the proposed Latin square image cipher and peer algorithms are listed in
Table II, where the method with the highest entropy score is shaded for each test image. These results show that
the proposed Latin square image cipher outperforms listed peer image encryption algorithms/methods.
The results of information entropy analysis for the complete set of test images are listed in Table III. These
results illustrate that the proposed Latin square image cipher
• obtains ciphertext images whose information entropy scores much closer to the entropy upper-bound than those
encrypted by other encryption methods;
• is effective and robust to different image contents and pixel intensity statistics;
• outperforms the conventional AES cipher implemented by bmpPacker and the method proposed in [6] in most
cases.
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TABLE II
ALGORITHM COMPARISON WITH INFORMATION ENTROPY
P Method Entropy
Chen et al. , 2004 [6] 7.9938
L Xiang et al. ,2006
[44]
7.9950
e Wong et al. , 2003
[45] (reported in [46])
7.9690
n Zhang et al. , 2010
[47]
7.9980
n Zhu et al. , 2010 [48] 7.9901
a Sun et al. ,2010 [46] 7.9965
Ours 7.997161
Entropy
P Channel\Method Wang et
al. 2011
[49]
Liu et
al. 2011
[50]
Patidar et al.
2011 [51]
Ours
Red 7.999324 7.9871 7.9957 7.999351
4.2.04 Green 7.999371 7.9802 7.9963 7.999416
(ColorLenna) Blue 7.999292 7.9878 7.9951 7.999314
Red N/a 7.9877 7.9952 7.999309
4.2.07 Green N/a 7.9881 7.9959 7.999285
(ColorPepper) Blue N/a 7.9877 7.9954 7.999258
TABLE III
RESULTS OF INFORMATION ENTROPY ANALYSIS
Ciphertext
File Plaintext Ours bmpPacker-AES2 Chen et al. , 2004[6]
4.1.01 6.898139 7.998963 7.988561 7.998430
4.1.02 6.294498 7.999027 7.979298 7.999061
4.1.03 5.970916 7.999122 7.990187 7.999113
4.1.04 7.426957 7.998948 7.990089 7.999032
4.1.05 7.068625 7.999140 7.981035 7.998891
4.1.06 7.537089 7.998936 7.989820 7.998902
4.1.07 6.583485 7.999241 7.990487 7.999033
4.1.08 6.852716 7.999199 7.997651 7.999182
4.2.01 7.242831 7.999808 7.998747 7.999760
4.2.02 6.416494 7.999756 7.997469 7.999763
4.2.03 7.762436 7.999765 7.997581 7.999752
4.2.04 7.750197 7.999799 7.997733 7.999772
4.2.05 6.663908 7.999756 7.997463 7.999746
4.2.06 7.762170 7.999789 7.997550 7.999747
4.2.07 7.669826 7.999766 7.908851 7.999781
5.1.09 6.709312 7.997266 7.906739 7.997011
5.1.10 7.311807 7.997667 7.941872 7.997144
5.1.11 6.452275 7.996775 7.929405 7.99652
5.1.12 6.705667 7.996730 7.363568 7.996729
5.1.13 1.548314 7.997299 7.903557 7.997143
5.1.14 7.342433 7.997022 7.992544 7.997271
5.2.08 7.201008 7.999359 7.987446 7.999257
5.2.09 6.993994 7.999240 7.984631 7.999199
5.2.10 5.705560 7.999250 7.998720 7.999303
5.3.01 7.523737 7.999820 7.998599 7.999801
5.3.02 6.830330 7.999819 7.990318 7.999831
7.1.01 6.027415 7.999353 7.989542 7.999321
7.1.02 4.004499 7.999284 7.983057 7.999302
7.1.03 5.495740 7.999325 7.993621 7.999192
7.1.04 6.107418 7.999315 7.983570 7.999313
7.1.05 6.563196 7.999302 7.985406 7.999296
7.1.06 6.695283 7.999279 7.985253 7.999268
7.1.07 5.991599 7.999437 7.990304 7.999221
7.1.08 5.053448 7.999371 7.983746 7.999236
7.1.09 6.189814 7.999412 7.985088 7.999271
7.1.10 5.908790 7.999391 7.998478 7.999235
7.2.01 5.641454 7.999811 7.985051 7.999829
boat.512 7.191370 7.999353 7.989566 7.999401
elaine.512 7.505984 7.999252 6.492821 7.999231
gray21.512 4.392295 7.999364 7.979908 7.999772
house 7.485787 7.999786 7.997553 7.999781
numbers.512 7.729247 7.999263 6.893247 7.999201
ruler.512 0.500033 7.999258 7.903134 7.999298
testpat.1k 4.407726 7.999809 7.903132 7.999800
# Best 31 0 13
Statistics Mean 7.999105 7.905055 7.9990486
Std 0.000856 0.290957 0.000903
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2) Adjacent Pixel Correlation Analysis: Adjacent pixel correlation (APC) is a quantitative measurement for image
randomness. It measures the correlations between adjacent pixels within an image. The adjacent pixel correlation
can be defined as an autocorrelation function as shown in Eq. (27), where Xt denotes an extracted pixel sequence
and Xt+1 denotes a pixel sequence where each pixel is the adjacent pixel of the corresponding pixel in Xt, µ is the
mean value defined by Eq. (28) and σ is the standard deviation defined by Eq. (29), the definition of mathematical
expectation is given in Eq. (30).
APC = E[(Xt − µ)(Xt+1 − µ)]/σ2 (27)
µ = E[X] (28)
σ =
√
E[(X − µ)2] (29)
E[x] =
N∑
i=1
xi/N (30)
The closer to zero this correlation coefficient is, the weaker relationship between the pixel sequence and its adjacent
pixel sequence. Because the adjacent pixel sequence can be extracted from the horizontal, vertical, or diagonal
direction, the adjacent pixel correlation will be analyzed with respect to these three directions.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Fig. 13. Adjacent pixels correlations before and after encryption - (a) plaintext Lenna P , (b) horizontal adjacent pixels in P , (c) vertical
adjacent pixels in P , (d) diagonal adjacent pixels in P , (e) ciphertext C = E(P,K), (f) horizontal adjacent pixels in C, (g) vertical adjacent
pixels in C, and (h) diagonal adjacent pixels in C.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF APC SCORES FOR THE IMAGE Lenna
Encryption Method Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
Original Lenna 0.9400 0.9709 0.9710
Awad, 2011 [16] 0.0127 -0.0093 -0.0059
Mao et al. , 2004 [6] -0.00024 -0.24251 0.23644
Liao et al. , 2010 [15] 0.0127 -0.0190 -0.0012
Fu et al. , 2011 [52] 0.0368 0.0392 0.0068
Ours 0.0053365 -0.0027616 0.0016621
Fig. 13 shows the randomly selected 1024 pairs of adjacent pixels along the horizontal, vertical and diagonal
directions. The horizontal axis of the scatter plot denotes the intensity of one randomly selected pixel and the
20 A DRAFT SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY
vertical axis denotes the intensity of its adjacent pixel. The APC results for the test image Lenna are listed in Table
IV. The proposed Latin square image cipher decorrelates adjacent pixels in the plaintext image and outperforms
the listed encryption algorithms [16], [6], [17], [15], [52] due to its smaller correlation coefficients.
Table V shows the APCs for test plaintext images and their corresponding ciphertext images using the Latin
square image cipher and peer algorithms, where the best APC score is shaded for each test image. These results
further demonstrates that the Latin square image cipher outperforms peer algorithms in most trails with the smallest
mean and standard deviation of APCs.
TABLE V
RESULTS OF ADJACENT PIXEL CORRELATION ANALYSIS
|APC(Plaintext)| |APC(Ciphertext)| × 10−3
File ×10−3 bmpPacker-
AES
Mao et al. ,
2005 [53]
Chen et al. ,
2004 [6]
Pareek et al.
, 2006 [54]
Ours
4.1.01 955.730 11.397 1.780 1.240 3.961 1.382
4.1.02 926.227 13.327 3.000 1.973 8.119 1.384
4.1.03 922.433 24.657 1.760 2.170 5.314 1.956
4.1.04 959.193 9.840 1.443 0.883 11.863 1.097
4.1.05 953.143 11.130 0.640 1.437 9.243 0.432
4.1.06 932.417 26.303 1.487 0.910 3.994 0.208
4.1.07 979.317 10.723 2.050 1.680 1.905 2.572
4.1.08 972.013 11.790 1.393 2.187 2.922 0.722
4.2.01 988.877 6.757 0.790 0.427 7.686 0.533
4.2.02 945.423 3.790 1.137 1.050 8.184 1.402
4.2.03 857.587 6.603 1.083 0.897 7.076 1.036
4.2.04 978.600 6.940 1.523 0.743 2.325 0.557
4.2.05 943.307 7.493 1.067 0.587 2.833 2.199
4.2.06 959.510 7.117 1.263 0.977 8.145 1.950
4.2.07 974.480 5.347 1.290 0.990 0.815 0.146
5.1.09 911.973 59.040 3.053 5.233 0.779 4.829
5.1.10 853.567 61.290 7.663 7.397 7.672 0.188
5.1.11 890.580 33.700 2.580 4.567 4.110 1.766
5.1.12 954.440 45.793 4.097 4.943 11.780 3.443
5.1.13 831.833 162.693 4.160 3.697 17.896 2.424
5.1.14 892.687 67.513 4.340 1.407 8.989 4.538
5.2.08 884.630 10.943 1.600 2.137 6.210 0.615
5.2.09 850.460 18.137 1.817 1.253 6.024 0.168
5.2.10 917.130 21.857 1.403 1.070 1.512 2.442
5.3.01 974.543 3.887 1.400 1.203 0.297 0.752
5.3.02 890.127 3.523 0.863 0.730 1.944 0.158
7.1.01 926.903 10.853 1.890 2.217 6.857 0.670
7.1.02 928.663 13.270 3.263 1.747 6.561 1.017
7.1.03 925.900 22.620 0.957 1.877 11.244 0.352
7.1.04 958.447 8.640 1.297 0.780 2.139 2.735
7.1.05 914.000 22.010 1.857 1.397 6.582 1.407
7.1.06 908.887 22.580 1.373 1.170 1.338 0.331
7.1.07 866.260 21.397 0.483 1.577 2.992 0.432
7.1.08 934.933 12.813 1.257 2.833 6.279 0.045
7.1.09 935.977 24.920 0.633 1.213 10.011 0.025
7.1.10 946.177 20.797 2.547 1.707 6.344 2.182
7.2.01 951.530 5.330 1.180 0.613 4.317 0.273
boat.512 942.427 19.453 1.207 0.887 9.823 2.120
elaine.512 969.757 14.950 1.607 2.777 7.839 4.381
house 993.220 116.010 1.213 2.507 10.950 0.757
gray21.512 941.383 5.990 1.590 1.280 12.766 1.359
numbers.512 692.123 26.230 2.257 1.733 11.103 1.948
ruler.512 313.253 51.003 1.947 0.890 3.126 1.270
testpat.1k 752.093 45.560 1.557 1.067 0.720 0.703
#Best 0 2 17 2 23
Statistics Mean 25.364 1.882 1.820 6.195 1.384
Std 30.331 1.275 1.406 3.968 1.222
C. Diffusion Property Analysis
The diffusion property describes the cipher ability of diffusing a change in a plaintext image over its corresponding
ciphertext image. If a cipher is weak in diffusion, it might be vulnerable against the differential attacks [28]. In
image encryption, the number of changing pixel rate (NPCR) and the unified averaged changed intensity (UACI) are
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two most common quantities used for evaluating the resistance of differential attacks against an image encryption
method/algorithm/cipher [6], [14], [15].
Mathematically, the NPCR N (C1, C2) and UACI U(C1, C2) scores between two ciphertext images C1 and C2,
whose plaintext images are slightly different, can be defined as Eqs. (31) and (32), respectively. The image of their
difference Diff(i, j) is defined in Eq. (33) and denotes whether two pixels located at the image grid (i, j) of C1
and C2 are equal. The symbols T and S denote the number of pixels in the ciphertext image and the number of
allowed pixel intensity scales, respectively.
N (C1, C2) =
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Diff(i, j)
T
× 100% (31)
U(C1, C2) =
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
|C1(i, j)− C2(i, j)|
S · T × 100% (32)
Diff(i, j) =
{
0, if C1(i, j) = C2(i, j)
1, if C1(i, j) 6= C2(i, j) (33)
It is noticeable that NPCR concentrates on the absolute number of pixels which changes values in differential
attacks, while the UACI focuses on the averaged difference between the paired ciphertext images.
Fig. 14 shows the sample results of the diffusion property of the Latin square image cipher. The plaintext image
P 1 differs from P 2 only one pixel on Lenna’s shoulder. C1 and C2 are corresponding ciphertext images using the
same encryption key. As can be seen, a single pixel difference between P 1 and P 2 diffuses to the entire cipher
image and leads to a significant difference between C1 and C2. Table VI shows corresponding NPCR and UACI
scores of C1 and C2 using the proposed Latin square image cipher and other encryption algorithms.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Fig. 14. Sample results of the cipher diffusion property - (a)plaintext Lenna original P 1, (b) plaintext Lenna modified P 2, (c) plaintext
difference |P 1 − P 2|, (d) ciphertext C1 = E(P 1,K), (e) ciphertext C2 = E(P 2,K), and (f) ciphertext difference |C1 − C2|
TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF THE NPCR AND UACI SCORES OF THE IMAGE Lenna
Encryption Method NPCR% UACI%
Zhu et al. , 2011 [14] 99.63 33.48
Chen et al. , 2004 [6] 99.25 33.14
Liao et al. , 2010 [15] 99.65 33.48
Ours 99.6689 33.4936
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TABLE VII
RESULTS OF DIFFUSION PROPERTIES
File UACI% NPCR%
4.1.01 33.4402 99.5885
4.1.02 33.3715 99.6272
4.1.03 33.5130 99.6297
4.1.04 33.5303 99.6023
4.1.05 33.4018 99.6028
4.1.06 33.5235 99.5956
4.1.07 33.5855 99.6302
4.1.08 33.4874 99.6089
4.2.01 33.4763 99.6058
4.2.02 33.4431 99.6179
4.2.03 33.5031 99.6120
4.2.04 33.5113 99.6146
4.2.05 33.4475 99.6231
4.2.06 33.4145 99.6113
4.2.07 33.4708 99.6031
5.1.09 33.6739 99.6170
5.1.10 33.5039 99.6170
5.1.11 33.5079 99.5529
5.1.12 33.4536 99.6033
5.1.13 33.3681 99.6033
5.1.14 33.6094 99.5636
5.2.08 33.5379 99.6067
5.2.09 33.3704 99.6151
5.2.10 33.5169 99.5987
5.3.01 33.5039 99.6115
5.3.02 33.4856 99.6077
7.1.01 33.5084 99.5918
7.1.02 33.4485 99.6124
7.1.03 33.5236 99.6346
7.1.04 33.5454 99.6029
7.1.05 33.3958 99.6063
7.1.06 33.4756 99.6262
7.1.07 33.4469 99.5953
7.1.08 33.5569 99.6128
7.1.09 33.3964 99.5953
7.1.10 33.3942 99.5880
7.2.01 33.4813 99.6142
boat.512 33.3792 99.5941
elaine.512 33.4430 99.6185
gray21.512 33.4651 99.6174
house 33.4570 99.6063
numbers.512 33.4484 99.6258
ruler.512 33.4471 99.6002
testpat.1k 33.4748 99.6018
D. Key Sensitivity Analysis
A secure cipher should have high key sensitivities in both encryption and decryption processes. Simulation results
with respect to encryption and decryption stages are shown in Fig. 15 and 16. The encryption keys in our simulations
are listed below in the HEX format:
K1 = ′B9B5ED7585C8B15D7454ED271AA3A3A3A07B00321C11759D0FDE340234384BC9′
K2 = ′B9B5ED7585C8B15D7454ED271AA3A3A3A07B00321C11759D0FDE340234384BC8′
K3 = ′39B5ED7585C8B15D7454ED271AA3A3A3A07B00321C11759D0FDE340234384BC8′
It is noticeable that K1 differs K2 only for the last bit; K2 differs K3 only for the first bit; and K1 differs K3
only for the first and the last bit. Although the hamming distances between K1,K2 and K3 are very small, i.e. they
are very similar to each other, their corresponding ciphertext images C1, C2 and C3 have significant differences.
These can be verified by the fact that their differences i.e. |C1 − C2|, |C2 − C3| and |C3 − C1| are random-like
images as shown in Fig. 15. The example shows the proposed Latin square image cipher is very sensitive to the
encryption key in the encryption stage.
Similar results can also be obtained in the decryption stage as shown in Fig. 16. We decrypt the same ciphertext
image C1 using the encryption keys K1,K2 and K3, respectively. As can be seen, using the correct encryption
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key K1, decrypted image D1 perfectly reconstructs the original plaintext image. However, decrypted images D2
and D3 using key K2 and K3 are random-like ones which do not contain any information related to the original
plaintext image.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g)
Fig. 15. Key sensitivity analysis for the encryption stage - (a) plaintext P Lenna, (b) ciphertext C1 = E(P,K1), (c) ciphertext C2 =
E(P,K2), (d) ciphertext C3 = E(P,K3), (e) ciphertext difference |C1 − C2|, (f) ciphertext difference |C2 − C3|, and (g) ciphertext
difference |C3 − C1|
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 16. Key sensitivity analysis for the decryption stage - (a) ciphertext C1, (b) decipheredtext D1 = D(C1,K1), (c) decipheredtext
D2 = D(C1,K2), and (d) decipheredtext D3 = D(C1,K3)
E. Noise Robustness Analysis
A good cipher should also be able to tolerate a certain amount of noise, e.g. noise in a channel or decoding errors.
As discussed previously, the proposed Latin square image cipher adopts an asymmetric structure for encryption
and decryption, and one noisy pixel in ciphertext image will only propagate in a factor of two in each round. Fig.
17 shows the results of the decryption robustness of the Latin square image cipher against various noise ratio in
ciphertext images. After decryption, noise concentrating in the center square of a ciphertext image now distributed
almost evenly over the deciphered image. Due to the psychovisual redundancy within an image, human vision
system is still able to recognize the deciphered image contents as long as it is not fully unintelligible.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce a symmetric-key Latin square image cipher with probabilistic encryption for grayscale
and color images. This new image cipher has distinctive characteristics: 1) LSIC is purely defined on integers, and
thus it can be easily implemented in software and hardware without causing finite precision or descritization
problems; 2) LSIC constructs all encryption primitives based on one keyed Latin square, including whitening,
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Fig. 17. Sample results of noise robustness in decryption - (a) ciphertext C and its decryptedtext D = D(C,K), (b) C1 with 0.025%
noise and D1 = D(C1,K), (c) C2 with 0.1% noise and D2 = D(C2,K), (d) C3 with 0.22% noise and D3 = D(C3,K), (e) C4 with
0.39% noise and D4 = D(C4,K), and (f) C5 with 1.56% noise and D5 = D(C5,K)
substitution and permutation, and thus it attains high sensitivities to any key change; 3) LSIC encrypts image pixels
in the unit of byte instead of bit and processes a 256 × 256 plaintext image at one time, and thus it is efficient
for image data; 4) LSIC arranges all these encryption primitives in the framework of substitution-permutation
network (SPN) and thus it attains good confusion and diffusion properties [27]; 5) LSIC also integrates probabilistic
encryption in a pre-processing stage and thus it allows to encrypt a plaintext image into different ciphertext images
when the same encryption key is used; and 6) LSIC’s decryption stage is robust against a certain level of noise
and thus it is suitable to transmit cipher data over a corrupted channel. The effectiveness and robustness of LSIC
have been demonstrated by extensive simulation results using the complete USC-SIPI Miscellaneous image dataset.
Theoretical security analysis shows that LSIC has good resistances to brute-force attacks, ciphertext-only attacks,
known-plaintext attacks and chosen-plaintext attacks. Experimental security analysis with comparisons to peer
algorithms indicate that LSIC outperforms or reaches state of the art. All these analysis and results demonstrate
that the LSIC is very suitable for digital image encryption. Finally, we open source the LSIC MATLAB code under
webpage https://sites.google.com/site/tuftsyuewu/source-code.
Although in our simulations we have not found any ’weak’ Latin squares, it is still an open question whether
such ’weak’ Latin squares exist. Meanwhile, it is natural to ask the next question that if such ’weak’ Latin squares
exist, how to recognize them in the very beginning and thus we are able to avoid using these Latin squares for
encryption. Eventually, we need some means to evaluate the suitability of a Latin square for image encryption.
However, Neither question is answered in this paper.
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